

Multicast Security Group Key Management Architecture

draft-ietf-msec-gkmarch-07.txt

Internet Security
Tobias Engelbrecht




Agenda

- Introduction
- Requirements of a GKMP
- Design of the GKMA
- Rekey Protocol
- Group Security Association
- Security Considerations



Introduction

- Defines a common architecture and design for group key-management protocols (GKMP)
- Examples:
 - video broadcast
 - multicast file transfers



Requirements of a Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP)



Requirements of a GKMP

- A group key management protocol (GKMP)
 - supports protected communication between members of a secure group
 - helps to ensure that only members of a secure group gain access to group data (by gaining access to group keys) and can authenticate group data.




Requirements of a GKMP

- Members receive security associations (SA)
- The group owner may define and enforce group membership, key management, data security and other policies
- Keys have a predetermined lifetime
- Key material should be delivered securely to the members of the group



Requirements of a GKMP

- The key-management protocol should be secure against replay and DoS attacks
- The protocol should facilitate addition and removal of group members
- The key management protocol should provide a mechanism to securely recover from a compromise of the key material
- ...




Design of the Group Key Management Architecture (GKMA)

Design of the Group Key Management Architecture (GKMA)

- The goal of a GKMP is to securely provide the group members with an up-to-date data security association (Data SA)
- GKMA Protocols
 - De- / Registration Protocol
 - Rekey Protocol


Design of the Group Key Management Architecture (GKMA)



MSEC Group Key Management Architecture

Design of the Group Key Management Architecture (GKMA)

A new member joins the group:




Design of the Group Key Management Architecture (GKMA)

Registration Protocol (RP)

- unicast protocol
- the GCKS and the member authenticates each other
- supplies the member with information to initialize a Data SA and a Rekey SA
- RP must ensure that the transfer is done over a Registration SA

Design of the Group Key Management Architecture (GKMA)

A new member leaves the group:



Design of the Group Key Management Architecture (GKMA)

Rekey Protocol

- multicast / unicast protocol from GCKS to members
- Rekey Messages are protected by the Rekey SA
- Rekey Messages update or change the Data SA and / or the Rekey SA

Design of the Group Key Management Architecture (GKMA)

Rekey Protocol

- Rekey messages are authenticated by
 - Source Authentication
 - Group Based Authentication
- ensures that all members receive the Rekey information in a timely manner


Design of the Group Key Management Architecture (GKMA)

- Group keys
 - key encryption key (KEKs)
 - traffic encryption key (TEKs)
- Traffic Protection Keys (TPKs) denote the combination of a TEK and a traffic integrity key
- Registration and / or Rekey Protocol establish the keys

Design of the Group Key Management Architecture (GKMA)

GCKS (Group Controller / Key Server)

- creates KEKs and TPKs
- performs authentication and authorization according to the group policy
- MAY present a credential to the group members signed by the group owner
- runs the Rekey protocol to push Rekey messages



Rekey Protocol

Rekey Protocol

A decorative graphic consisting of six circles arranged in two rows. The top row has three circles: a solid light purple circle, a hollow light purple circle, and a solid light purple circle. The bottom row has three circles: a solid light purple circle, a hollow light purple circle, and a solid light purple circle.

Properties

- to ensure that all members receive the rekey information in a timely manner
- mechanism to re-sync keys
- avoid implosion problems

Rekey Protocol



Transport & Protection

- encrypted with the Group KEK
- authentication with MAC or digital signature
- sequence number protect against replay attacks
- reliable transport

Rekey Protocol

A decorative graphic consisting of six circles arranged in two rows. The top row has three circles: a solid light purple circle, a hollow light purple circle, and a solid light purple circle. The bottom row has three circles: a solid light purple circle, a hollow light purple circle, and a solid light purple circle.


Implosion

- Reasons

- all members contact the GCKS at the same time
- packet loss (feedback implosion)

- Solutions

- a member waits before sending an out-of sync or feedback message
- a member contacts an other server



Group Security Association (GSA)

Group Security Association (GSA)

- consists of the Registration SA, Rekey SA (optional) and Data SA
- WITHOUT Rekey SA
 - Registration Protocol initializes and updates one or more DATA SA
- WITH Rekey SA
 - Registration Protocol initializes the Rekey SA
 - Data SA is initialized by the Rekey Protocol



Group Security Association (GSA)

Contents of the Rekey SA


- Policy
- Group Identity
- Key encryption keys
- Authentication Key
- Replay Protection
- Security Parameter Index (SPI)



Group Security Association (GSA)

Contents of the Data SA

- Group Identity
- Source Identity
- Traffic Protection Keys
- Sequence Numbers
- Security Parameter Index (SPI)
- Data SA Policy



Security Considerations




Security Considerations

- authenticated key exchange techniques limit the effects of man-in-the-middle and connection-hijacking attacks
- sequence numbers and low-computation message authentication techniques can be effective against replay and reflection attacks
- cookies can reduce the effects of denial of service attacks



Security Considerations

- sharing of secrets among a group of members can cause problems
- the Registration protocol should be so good as the base protocol on which it is developed
- the Rekey protocol is new and has unknown risks associated with



Thanks for your attention

Questions?